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AN OUTSIDER'S VIEW POINT OF THE NATURE
OF TRUSTS
PIERRE LEPAULLE*

It has already been remarked that trusts are the most amazing
part of the Anglo-American Law for the Civil Law jurist. Indeed
such amazement does not begin when he encounters a trust instrument for the first time: in most instances, he will compare it (if he has
some imagination!) with some civil law technique that will look to
him rather similar. But, when afterwards he will examine other trust
deeds, he will have to compare them with quite different techniques
of his own system. Hence, after the study of one definite trust, he
may say: "Trusts are the same thing as our fideicommissum." But
his further experiences will show him that they are not so easily
understood and that they may sometimes look like a usufruct, an
executorship, a donation with charge, a dotal regime, a wife separate
estate regime, fiducia, etc. Such comparisons-and others-have
been made by many European Courts. This leads the civilian to
realize that he has only seen external and partial aspects of the
trusts, and has failed to understand their nature. If he tries to grasp
it, he will confront the same disappointing experience as that of the
young Prince who runs after a Fairy: when he is on the poiut of reaching her, she has taken another form, ceases to be a beautiful lady, but
has become a white bird, or an old witch!
If, in order to avoid such misadventures, the civilian leaves aside
concrete trust instruments and turns to books dealing with the subject in general, he will be somewhat puzzled, as most often the authors
content themselves with distinguishing trusts from other relationships, and telling what trusts are not, but fail to reach a conclusion
and tell you what they are. When text books endeavour to give in
their definition something more than a mere rough and rapid description, it is apparent that they adopt one of the two following theories:
the first one according to which the trust is a right in personam held
by the cestui que trust against the trustee, the second one holding that
it is a partition of property rights between the cestui and the trustee.
Unfortunately, the partisans of each theory seem to have preemptpry
arguments to destroy the other one, so that the poor civilian remains
somewhat lonely on the battle-field.
Indeed such absence of synthesis may be without great inconveniences in Anglo-Saxon countries, where trusts accompany the
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rythm of life, from the cradle to the grave, where every one knows
what it is from seeing it functioning at the home as in the office. But
the civilian, being an outsider, is bound to consider trusts from a
logical point of view if he wants to understand them, and intuition
could not be a safe guide for him. Such point of view may also
perhaps be of some interest to Common Law lawyers precisely for
that reason that it is an outsider's view point. As Paul Claudel once
put it: "It is sometimes dangerous to listen to poets, but remember
that, being in the moon, they are the only ones to see the earth as a
whole!"
If our aim is worth while, the result reached will be of some interest
only if the proper method is used. What is going to be our method?
The answer is quite simple: We want to make a synthesis. We must,
therefore, take into account all the facts, i.e. the whole law of trusts
and all kinds of them-whether express or constructive and resulting
-whether private or charitable.
Supposing these facts known, and before making our own synthesis, we must first examine if any one of the two classic theories
on the nature of trusts is satisfactory. Let us consider them separately and take first the theory according to which the essence of the
trust is to be found in a right in personam of the cestui against the
trustee.
At first glance it appears that such a theory should at least be
completed: in order to explain why the cestui has the right to follow
the res, it should be said that the right in personam of the cestui is
protected by a lien good against third parties in most cases; and, of
course, a lien is a right in rem!
Even so completed the theory is not satisfactory for many reasons.
We will give but few of them, since such criticisms have been often
made:
i. When the res is real property, the cestui's interest is considered
also as real property;
2. The res is in no way part of the assets of the trustee; it can not be
attached by his creditors; in some States, at the death of the trustee,
the title passes to the court, according to statutes that have never been
considered as depriving any one of property without due process of law;
3. The cestui can sue third parties in his own name when the
trustee can not or will not act.
4. The essence'of the trust can not be a right in personam of the
cestui, since in many cases the cestui is not a person. Who would be
the "person" in most charitable trusts and in a number of private
trusts, like In re Dean, for example?
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We may, therefore, conclude that the in personam theory fails to
explain the nature of trusts and does not fit with all the facts we have
to take account of.
Is the theory according to which trusts are a partition of property
rights (one having the legal title, the other the equitable title) more
satisfactory? It does not seem to us that it is. In order to speak of
partition, one must have at least two parties; in order to speak of
equitable title, one must find a title holder. Where would such an
indispensable element be found in a trust to erect a monument to the
first husband of one's wife, or for one's dogs and horses, or for saying
masses, etc.? Does not a good deal of the originality and value of
trusts come from the fact that cestuis need not always be considered
by law as "entities"?
Moreover the res of the trust can be a debt for instance: could
any one say that there is in such cases a right in rem on a right in
personam?
Finally, we will see a little later that a trust can not be a partition
'of the element of individual ownership because if one makes an
addition of all the rights of the trustee and those of the cestui, the
result gives something very different from the notion of ownership.
We come, therefore, to the conclusion that the in rem theory is
unable to reach the nature of trusts.
What is the reason of the failure of both theories? In our opinion,
a defective method of approach to the problem. It seems to us that
any one starting from the notion of right could not reach any result,
since it is impossible to point out one single definite right (or duty)
that is to be found necessarily in all trusts. For instance, it cannot be
said that a trustee must necessarily preserve the substance of the res,
since in cases of trusts for the benefit of creditors, he must most often
sell it. It cannot either be stated that the trustee has an absolute duty
to account, since in discretionary trusts he may be freed from such an
obligation. It is submitted that if one could take one by one all the
rights and duties that the trustee and the cestui have, one would
realize that each of these rights and duties taken separately could be
stricken out without destroying the trust in its essence.
Moreover, in considering a number of concrete trust-instruments,
one is amazed to realize how widely rights and duties of the diverse
parties may differ from onetrust to another: for instance, if an individual puts his property in a Trust Company simply to avoid temporarily the trouble of administration of his fortune, the rights and
duties of the trustees will differ widely from those of the trustees of
the Carnegie Foundation in which property had been put in trust to
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promote the establishment of peace in the world. In the first example,
the cestui fully capable controls the property and checks the trustee
through a number of rights given to him; in the second one, the cestui
is agenerous dream, a hope, a chimera incapable of having any right.
If, on the one hand, no definite right nor obligation is of the essence
of the trust, if, on the other hand, the number and scope of rights and
obligations of the parties may vary widely from one trust to
another, we must go necessarily beyond these two notions and look for
the dynamic principle that organizes and determines from the outside both rights and obligations.
Where shall we find that dynamic principle? One might be inclined to say that it is the intention of the settlor; but it would not be a
satisfactory explanation, since we want to find what is the essence
of all trusts, including, therefore, in our study resulting and constructive trusts.
We may be led in the right direction by recalling: i. That all that
is necessary for the existence of a trust is a res and an appropriation
of that res to some aim; 2. That a trustee is not necessary for the
existence of the trust, but becomes indispensable for its normal
functioning. The rights and obligations of the trustee will vary
according to only one thing, his mission. Such mission always consists
in insuring that the res be properly appropriated to the aim to which
it has been devoted, either by the settlor, by the court, or by operation of law. The rights that the trustee will have in. each particular
case depend on his obligations; they are tools given to him for the
fulfillment of his duties, and such duties are determined by the
appropriation to which the res has been devoted. Hence, it is apparent that: trustee, cestui, rights and obligations of either of them are
only means for reaching an end and that no one of these means is in
itself essential to the existence of the trust; that the essence of such
legal institution can only be found in the res and its appropriation to
some aim. Trusts appear to us, then, as a segregation of assets from
the patrimonium of individuals, and a devotion of such assets to a
certain function, a certain end. When property is held in trust, one
knows how it is going to be used; its purpose, its raison d'6tre are
determined; while, on the contrary, when property is subjected to
private ownership, no one knows what is going to become of it. We
may then formulate this first conclusion that a trust is an appropriation of assets; that some one will be in charge of such appropriation
and that the whole world must respect it.'
'Whether third parties having no knowledge of the trust are bound or not to
refrain from interfering with it, is a matter of no importance in the study of the
nature of trusts, for this simple reason that the protection of bona fide third
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At this point ofie may stop and ask: "Can not a corporation be
considered also as an appropriation of assets and, if that is so, what
is the difference between a trust and a legal entity?"
It is indeed striking to remark that trusts are often used in America
as a substitute for corporations; but nevertheless we do not admit the
theory according to which a corporation is an appropriation of assets;
it is clear, for instance, that a corporation sole does not involve in
itself any idea of property.
Moreover, the notion of appropriation is not at all as fundamental
in a corporation as in a trust for this reason that in each jurisdiction
corporation laws together with the Common Law have established a
number of fixed rules determining most of the rights and duties of
directors, shareholders, etc. The idea of appropriation instead of
being the supreme master has only a strictly limited field defined by
what can be put in the by-laws. In other words, we do not see in
corporations anything more than in many other legal techniques in
which the intention of the parties has a certain area within which it
can be enforced. Hence, the notion of trust is quite different from
that of corporation and it can alone be qualified as an appropriation
of assets.
But we must go beyond our first conclusion because assets do not
appropriate themselves by an act of God. There must be a practical
device to realize such an appropriation. As the device is always the
same: the requirement of a trustee, we are here again in front of an
essential element that must be incorporated in our synthesis. There
need not be any settlor, any cestui, but there must be a trustee,
who must be a person in the eye of the law.
Is that second necessary element that we have just pointed out
the last one that we need? It seems so, since: x. Neither a settlor nor
a cestui are essential parties in a trust; 2. The rights of the trustee are
only secondary, may vary in each case, and are simply means allowing
him to perform his duties, or to be reimbursed, or compensated, for
having performed them; 3. All the trustee's obligations depend on
only one fundamental obligation: that of assuring to the res its
appropriation; 4. The three essential elements of a trust: a res-an
appropriation-a trustee, have been taken into account.
parties is a question of general policy of the law and has nothing to do with this
or that particular technique. If third parties must deal normally with the trustee,
it is because the latter is in charge of the appropriation; but if the cestui can

act in case of failure of the trustee to do so, it is because the idea of appropriation
is paramount. It is for the same reason that the creditors of the trustee have no
right in the res, and that his heirs do not get any part of it.
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We are therefore in a position to propose the following definition
of the trust: an appropriation of assets realized by means of a legal
"person" who is subjected to the obligation of taking all reasonable
steps to realize such appropriation, and who has all the rights necessary to fulfill such obligation.
It is submitted that such a definition gives the essential elements
without which a trust can not be conceived, and applies to all kinds of
trusts-express or implied (constructive and resulting), private,
public, or charitable.
We are now able to examine the different consequences that flow
from the nature of the trust.
I. The first consequence is that if the trust is an appropriation of
property, it is a notion thoroughly different from the idea of private
ownership, but which is, so to speak, on the same level. It is most
striking to realize that such a deduction is amply confirmed by the
study of the way in which trusts function, since such study shows
that, on the one hand, all essential elements of individual ownership
may be missing in a trust, and, on the other hand, elements entirely
ignored in property law may be found in trusts. Let us examine
rapidly these two points.
We will remark in connection with the first one that the idea of
individual ownership is substantially the same in all civilized countries
that have not adopted communistic theories. When an American,
an Englishman, an Italian, a Frenchman say: "I own this house," all
of them mean that they can live in it, rent it, pull it down, transform
it, sell it, give it away, etc. For the sake of brevity the Roman Law
said that individual ownership meant usus (right of enjoyment),
fructus (right to get the rents, fruits, crops, income of all kinds),
abusus (right to destroy the res, or to dispose of it in any way). It is
quite possible that all of these three elements may be missing in a
trust. The usus disappears in all cases where the res must be rented;
such would be the case if, for example, the res is a farm and the cestui
a minor child. The fructus does not exist either when the cestui is
entitled to a fixed interest, or if the trust is discretionary: neither the
trustee nor the beneficiary has the right to take the whole income for
himself. As to the abusus, it must be noticed that the trustee is never
allowed to destroy or give away the res, and that he may often be
forbidden to sell it.
Moreover, when one speaks of individual ownership, one means
that the thing owned must necessarily be part of the assets of some
one, while that is not necessarily true for a trust res. Let us take, for
example, a discretionary trust in favor of Afor life, the res to be
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death. The
unborn children at A-'s
turned over to A-'s
capital is not a part of the assets of the trustee, since his own creditors
have no rights in it, since he cannot dispose of it, etc. As A-'s
has nothing to do with
children are not yet in existence, and as Athe capital, the latter is part of no one's assets. As to the income, it
assets, since he has no right to it, the trust
is not a part of A-'s
being discretionary; it is not either a part of the trustee's assets,
since the portion of the income he does not pay over to the cestui
must be accumulated. Therefore the res is in nobody's patrimonium.
Hence it must be clear that all elements essential to the idea of individual ownership may be missing in a trust.
On the other hand, two elements quite foreign to the idea of individual ownership are inherent to the trust: the first one is the right to
follow the res in its economic transformations. The res, in case of
ownership, is a concrete, definite thing, whereas, in case of trust, it is a
somewhat intangible economic element that can take successively
different forms: yesterday it was a horse, today it is the cow for which
the trustee has exchanged the horse, tomorrow it will be the Victrola bought with the money obtained by the sale of the cow. The
object of private ownership is concrete, the object of trusts is
intangible.
Moreover, private ownership is the consecretion of individualism:
in a village, in which all property would be subjected to private
ownership, the fields may be full of weeds and uncultivated, the
houses may fall into decay, the trees may be covered with ivy.
Ownership means freedom: even anti-social freedom, it does not
involve in itself the idea of effort, of care, of efficiency. But in a
village where all property would be held in trust, fields must be well
ploughed, carefully cultivated, houses must be kept in good repair,
and trees must be pruned. Trusts involve the duty of preservation,
of good management, of production: it has a social value by which it
opposes itself to ownership. The two legal institutions have back of
them two profoundly different and even opposed philosophies. It is
indeed significant to see them both flourish side by side in AngloSaxon countries where individualism and social spirit are at the same
time developed to a high degree. We may therefore conclude on this
point in saying that Anglo-Saxon countries have two different
2
regimes for property: individual ownership and trusts.

2

No wonder then, that the res of a trust may consist in something that does
not fit in the categories of real and personal property. Green v. Folgham,
I Sir. & St. 398 (Oh. 1823).
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II. The second consequence that we draw from our definition is
that the so often criticized theory of "right without subject" could be
considered under a more favorable light in the law of trusts.
To put it roughly, the theory referred to here is this: There is no
reason why a right should always require a subject: i.e. some person
who is entitled to it. One understands that it is necessary to be a
person to enforce a right; but enforcement is quite different from the
right itself. Anything that is worth being protected by law should
have rights: animals, things, ideas, etc. According to such a theory,
in a corporation it is the corporate property that has the rights of the
corporation, while the Board of directors have only the power to
enforce them.
It is indeed striking to realize that most of the objections made
against such a theory would lose their strength when applied to
trusts.
Let us review briefly these objections.
a) It is said, at first, that that theory has socialistic tendencies,
since it depossesses the individual in favor of the idea of appropriation. The answer is simple: We have seen that it is quite true in
case of trusts. Individual ownership is superseded by the idea of
appropriation, and nevertheless America is perhaps the country of
the world most remote from socialism.
b) A second objection often made is that, if the owner was overshadowed by the idea of appropriation, he would lose control over the
property. The answer is that it is not an objection but an explanation, since it is perfectly true that, as long as the appropriation is
continued, neither the settlor, nor the c. q. t. can object, and that
the former owner ceases in most cases to have the right to change the
appropriation.
c) It is further said that, if there is no entity (physical or legal)
considered as the subject of the rights in property, the State could
take over such property, while no one would be in a position to make a
legitimate protest. If such an obligation means that the State has.
the power to take over such property, that is true, but it is just as
true in case of private ownership, since by force, the State can always
do what it wants against private individuals. If the criticism means
that no one has the possibility of protecting the property, that is not
true since the main duty of the trustee is precisely to do so. If,
finally, the objection purports to suggest that the State might realize
itself the appropriation, it will certainly make English and American
readers smile. Indeed there is no practical danger that the American
Government, for instance, will grant to itself the monopoly of being
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trustee. Moreover, as far as the English Government does it through
the institution of the Public trustee, it does it to everybody's satisfaction.
d) The last objection usually made against the theory of rights
without subject is that any right supposes a will to exercise it, and
that a will cannot be conceived without a subject. We may dismiss
quickly such a criticism and answer: Of two things one: either the
proposition that any right supposes a will is an a priori, or an a
posteriori,principle; in the first case, it would be nothing more than an
hypothesis, which must be abandoned if it does not succeed; in the
second case, it is clear that the principle would be true only if really
there are no rights without subject. In other words the objection
3
presupposes what it purports to prove.
It seems therefore that an explanation of the trust that would
cast aside the classic theory of a right might have been attempted in
connection with trusts. But such attempt has not been made by
Anglo-Saxon theorists who are still faithful to the notion that no
rights can exist without a subject: if the cestui is a person in the eye
of the law, he will have some rights, if he is not, he will not have any.
As to the trustee, his rights will always be in some one; for example, if
not otherwise provided by law, will, or trust deed, they will pass to his
heirs at his death, as long as the court has not appointed a new
trustee.4 That leads us to the third consequence of our definition.
III. If the trust maintains the theory of no right without a subject,
we must find for such right another foundation than the one given in
the two classical theories.
According to the first one, the basis of rights is to be found in the
free will of the subject. It is apparent that such a theory cannot
3

Is it not strikingly significant to see that the propounders of the theory of
rights without subject have proposed the distinction between two kinds of rights:
Genuss and Verf-agung, that correspond very closely to the rights of the cestui
and those of the trustee? The rights of the first category are those protecting
the enjoyment of the property, while the others correspond to the power exercised
over it: for instance, the rights of an unborn child over someproperty are of the
first category and do not require any will, while the rights of the guardian over
the same property are of the second type and cannot be conceived without a will.
Exactly the same thing can be said for the cestui and the trustee. The exercise
of the trusteeship cannot be conceived without the exercise of a will; on the contrary, a cestui may be conceived without any will, since a monument, a dream
of Peace may be considered as cestuis.
4There is, however, one instance in which the subjective theory does not seem
to work: that is in States that have provided by statute that title will rest in
the court at the trustee's death. As a court is not a legal entity, we do not see
who is the subject of the trustee's rights during that time.
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explain the rights of the trustee, since they depend on the obligations
he has to fulfill, and since obligations are a partial abdication of one's
freedom and may be considered as a first step towards slavery.
The second theory is not more satisfactory since it explains the
existence of rights by the protected interests of the subject itself, and
since it is quite clear that a trustee does not exercise any rights for his
own benefit.
The only possible theory is that the rights of the trustee have their
foundation in his obligations:they are tools given to him in order to
achieve the work assigned to him. The trustee gets all the tools
necessary for such end, but only those, in order to allow him to insert
his effort in society and to work either for someone else, or for an idea
recognized as worth while in the community in which he lives.
We reach therefore a social theory of subjective rights that
opposes itself to the classical theories based on individualism.
Law is a system of social control; society cannot be explained by a
mere addition of individuals: we are not, therefore, astonished to
realize that any theory that explains subjective rights only by and
for the individual is not satisfactory.
We may then conclude that trusts appear as a most coherent legal
institution: it is not a part of the law of property: it opposes itself to
it in this that property law is based on individualism, while trusts
are in their essence a social institution; but trusts are on the same
plan as individual ownership. Moreover, the technique of the trusts
preserves the classical concept of "no right without a subject," but
it can only maintain it if we replace the purely individualistic basis of
such theory by a widely social foundation. Hence trusts form a
logical whole if one does not try to force them into frames that are
not fitted for them. It is submitted that if one ceases to explain
trusts by using the difference between the jurisdiction of common law
and equity courts, legal title and equitable title, rights in rem and
rights in personam, many fallacious explanations may be avoided
and the true nature of trusts may be better discovered.
Such a drastic conclusion will perhaps be excused, since it does not
pretend to be more than the point of view of an indiscreet outsider.

